DEPARTMENT OF STATE / AID

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AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA

RESPONSE TO SENATOR HAYAKAWA

1. The Package: F-15 Enhancements & AWACS

The F-15's sold to Saudi Arabia are air superiority fighters -- not "fighter bombers." They are optimized for air-to-air combat and air defense -- not for ~~ground attack~~. The F-15 enhancements in the proposed package are designed to improve the defensive capabilities of the aircraft.

The AWACS is an unarmed flying radar platform, possessing no electronic or photographic surveillance capabilities. It is a defensive system that meets legitimate security needs of the Saudis and helps protect our own vital supplies of oil originating in the Persian Gulf.

2. Implications of the Sale for Saudi Arabia and Israel

The air defense enhancement package for Saudi Arabia has been designed to meet significant Saudi defense requirements while minimizing the impact on the Arab-Israeli balance.

The package is designed to help Saudi Arabia defend itself against regional threats, without measurably increasing Saudi offensive potential. The AWACS is the most crucial part of the package because it provides the early warning without which there could be no successful defense of vitally important Saudi oil facilities. Without AWACS, sufficient early warning capability will not exist, no matter how many ground radars might be employed.

With or without the AWACS and F-15 enhancements, the Saudi Air Force realistically poses no significant threat to the security of Israel. Concerns for the Saudis using an AWACS to coordinate an Arab attack on Israel are simply not supported by the facts:

-- Extensive, and easily detected, advance planning/training and inter air force equipment modifications would be required for such an attack.

-- Saudi AWACS cannot be modified without US approval, and Saudi assurances include limitations on the transfer of equipment and data to third parties.

-- The US will provide technical support for the aircraft throughout its life cycle, and this support would be withdrawn in the event these agreements are violated.

4. Saudi Need for and Ability to Use AWACS

Without an airborne surveillance capability like AWACS, the Saudis cannot provide adequate defense for their oil facilities. The proximity of the threat and the location of their oil complexes make ground radar sites an unworkable alternative. Only with aerial surveillance will the Saudis be able to detect enemy aircraft in sufficient time to engage them prior to an attack on the oil fields.

Our proposal envisions that the Saudis will ultimately gain a high degree of self-sufficiency in operation of the aircraft and will be able to conduct operational level maintenance and some intermediate level maintanance. The Saudis will never be completely self sufficient in all maintenance areas due to manpower limitations, and our maintenance and technical teams will provide the means through which the US will continue to participate in the Saudi AWACS program.

5. AWACS as a Symbol of Saudi Power

The deployment of USAF AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq clearly demonstrates that the sale of AWACS is much more than a symbol, and will have a very real and practical impact upon the Saudi defense posture. The introduction of a Saudi capability will make this impact lasting.

The AWACS sale is proposed as a result of a U.S. study of the air defense requirements for Saudi Arabia. The study indicated a need for an airborne surveillance platform to provide the early warning time needed to defend the oil fields. Thus, AWACS is a legitimate and vital Saudi air defense requirement and a means of enhancing the protection of our own vital access to Mideast oil.

6. Security of US Technology

The AWACS does not represent the ultimate in US radar, computer, and anti-jamming technology. The radar is mid-1960's pulse doppler, textbook technology. A comparable computer is available commercially. What is sensitive technology aboard the AWACS is the computer software. This software, if compromised, can be reprogrammed in a matter of days, thus negating any explanation by adversaries. A new Soviet airborne early warning aircraft, a derivative of the CANDID transport aircraft, has been under development for some time and is expected to have a capability quite similar to our own AWACS. This new Soviet system should be in their operational inventory before the AWACS is delivered to Saudi Arabia in late 1985.

In response to stated Congressional concerns, including those of Senator Hayakawa, very stringent physical security arrangements have been negotiated with the Saudis. These arrangements of AWACS go far beyond our requirements and will be completed prior to delivery of that aircraft.

Compromise or loss of this technology, of course, would beundesirable, but it would not seriously damage US security interests. Additionally, if the AWACS is not sold to Saudi Arabia, similar technology transfer or loss could occur if the British NIMROD were provided and lost.

7. US National Security Interest

The fundamental reason for this sale is the President's judgment that it makes a significant contribution to our national security interests in a vital part of the world. Perhaps most important to this issue, therefore, is how the sale of this proposed air defense enhancement package to Saudi Arabia serves US national security interests:

-- It will help restore US credibility as a reliable security partner in the region.

-- It will help meet some of our military needs in the Gulf by contributing to the development of an improved air defense early warning and control network.

-- It will provide an extensive logistics base and support infrastructure that is fully compatible with equipment that would be deployed to the Gulf with US forces in a contingency. (If US help was requested

-- It will provide a positive foundation for more extensive US-Saudi security cooperation over time.

It should be noted that if the Saudis are forced to turn to alternative sources for their own protection (e.g., NIMROD), these advantages will not accrue to the US.

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Department of State

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ORIGIN NEA-07

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-15	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	NEA-06	L-03	DOE-10	PM-09
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TAGS: MASS, US, SA
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 15 STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY TO SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY AT OPENING OF HIS OCTOBER 15 TESTIMONY BEFORE SFRC:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I WOULD LIKE TO OPEN MY STATEMENT TODAY BY EXPRESSING MY ADMIRATION AND THANKS FOR THE VERY FAIR AND THOROUGH WAY IN WHICH YOU HAVE CONDUCTED THESE HEARINGS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS APPEARED BEFORE YOU TWICE IN BOTH OPEN AND EXECUTIVE SESSION, AND YOU HAVE HEARD A LARGE NUMBER OF WITNESSES ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE. YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPLORE FULLY BOTH THE DETAILSAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT SALE.

COINCIDENTALLY, SINCE THESE HEARINGS WERE INITIATIED, TWO EVENTS OCCURRED IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH DEMONSTRATE IN THE STARKEST POSSIBLE WAY BOTH THE REALITY OF THE THREAT TO VITAL AMERICAN INTERESTS AND THE ABSOLUTE IMPORTANCE OF AN

ACTIVE, SUSTAINED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION. THE IRANIAN AIR ATTACK ON KUWAITI OIL FACILITIES UNDERSCORED THE NEED OF OUR FRIENDS TO ACQUIRE ADEQUATE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, BOTH TO PROTECT THEIR PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND ENHANCE STABILITY BY DETERRING ATTACKS BY REGIONAL POWERS. THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT SADAT IS A REMINDER TO US ALL THAT OUR POLICIES IN THE AREA MUST BE BUILT ON THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS SO THAT WE MAY DEVELOP ENDURING RELATIONSHIPS NOT ONLY WITH PARTICULAR LEADERS AND GOVERNMENTS, BUT WITH THE PEOPLES AND NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST THAT ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO US.

THE TENSIONS REFLECTED BY THESE TWO EVENTS IN TURN LEND THEMSELVES TO EXPLOITATION BY THE SOVIETS AND BY THE RADICAL ARAB STATES WHOM THE SOVIETS HAVE SO LAVISHLY SUPPLIED. THE DRAMATIC GROWTH OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY POWER COMBINED WITH THE POLITICAL PRESSURES IT IS ABLE TO BRING TO BEAR DIRECTLY OR THROUGH WELL-ARMED PROXIES NOW THREATENS WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE ENTIRE REGION LYING BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN SOVIET BORDER AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE SOVIETS INVADED AFGHANISTAN FIRST BECAUSE THEY HAD THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO DO SO WITHOUT DETRACTING SIGNIFICANTLY FROM SOVIET STRENGTH ALONG THEIR EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, WAS THE FACT THAT THEY KNOW THEY INCURRED LITTLE RISK OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION BY REGIONAL STATES OR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. IF WE DO NOT IMPROVE THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THIS CRITICAL AREA SO AS TO CREATE CREDIBLE DETERRENTS TO FURTHER SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT THEY WILL OCCUR.

WITH THE HELP AND THE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS, WE ARE MOVING TO STRENGTHEN OUR OWN MILITARY FORCES AND OUR ABILITY TO PROJECT AMERICAN POWER IN TIMES OF CRISIS. BUT THAT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. THE MORE DIFFICULT TASKS OF RE-ESTABLISHING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST ALSO BE ADDRESSED, AND FOR THAT WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT. THE SALE UNDER CONSIDERATION TODAY LIES AT THE HEART OF THIS ENDEAVOR.

IN STRENGTHENING SAUDI ARABIA'S AIR DEFENSES, WE WILL BE MAKING AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SAUDI SECURITY AND TO THE PROTECTION OF OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS. THE SAUDIS WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO DEFEND THEIR OIL FACILITIES, POPULATION CENTERS AND KEY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND IN THAT WAY, TO DETER AN ATTACK ON THEM. THE SALE WILL ALSO GO A LONG WAY TOWARD RESTORING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AS A RELIABLE SECURITY PARTNER IN THE REGION;

ONE ABLE AND WILLING TO HELP THE REGION'S NATIONS ACQUIRE LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

THE SALE WILL GREATLY ENHANCE U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA. IT WOULD ENSURE THAT AWACS EARLY WARNING INFORMATION WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES IN THE REGION FROM NOW INTO THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. IT WOULD PUT IN PLACE IN THE AREA AN INFRASTRUCTURE OF INSTALLATIONS, COMPATIBLE EQUIPMENT AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES SHOULD LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE IN A CRISIS. THIS MESSAGE WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE SOVIET UNION. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE DISCUSSION BEFORE YOU OF THESE KEY U.S. OBJECTIVES. RATHER, THE DEBATE HAS TENDED TO FOCUS ON CONCERNS OF A DIFFERENT ORDER. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE CENTERED ON THE DETAILS OF THE SPECIAL UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE AND THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAVE NEGOTIATED AND AGREED TO IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSFER OF THIS EQUIPMENT. THESE UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED TO YOU IN SOME DETAIL. THEY ARE THE PRODUCT OF MONTHS OF WORK DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED SET OF UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WILL MEET U.S. INTERESTS AND THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS WHILE RESPECTING SAUDI SOVEREIGNTY. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE SUCCEEDED.

THE SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO COMPREHENSIVE AND FAR-REACHING MEASURES TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF U.S. EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A GENERAL SECURITY OF MILITARY INFORMATION AGREEMENT:

-- U.S. INSPECTION TEAMS WILL BE ABLE TO MONITOR SAUDI SECURITY PROCEDURES ON A REGULAR BASIS;

-- ONLY U.S. AND SAUDI PERSONNEL WILL PERFORM OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS ON THIS EQUIPMENT;

-- SPECIAL SECURITY FACILITIES WILL BE CONSTRUCTED AND SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED AND PUT IN PLACE; AND

-- A COMPLETE SECURITY PLAN WILL BE DEVELOPED JOINTLY AND SUBMITTED FOR U.S. APPROVAL ONE YEAR BEFORE THE FIRST SAUDI AWACS IS DELIVERED.

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WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE SAUDIS SHARE FULLY OUR DESIRE TO DEVELOP THE TIGHTEST SECURITY SYSTEM IT IS POSSIBLE TO

DESIGN. WE ARE IMMENSELY SATISFIED WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING.

WE HAVE ALSO WORKED HARD TO ASSURE THAT NONE OF THE EQUIPMENT BEING PROVIDED WILL POSE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. SAUDI ARABIA HAS AGREED THAT THE EQUIPMENT WILL BE USED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY. THE AWACS WILL NOT OPERATE BEYOND SAUDI ARABIA'S TERRITORIAL BORDERS. INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE AWACS WILL NOT BE SHARED WITH THIRD PARTIES WITHOUT U.S. CONSENT. THESE SAFEGUARDS, COMBINED WITH THE INHERENT LIMITATIONS AND VULNERABILITY OF THE AWACS AIRCRAFT, THEIR VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUED SAFETY OF SAUDI OIL FACILITIES, AND THEIR TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON AMERICAN GROUND CREWS FOR MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT, ALL ADD UP TO THE MOST PRACTICAL KIND OF ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE USED -- IN FACT, CANNOT BE USED -- TO POSE A REALISTIC THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

THERE WILL BE CONTINUING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE SAUDI AWACS SYSTEM. SAUDI ARABIA HAS REQUESTED MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE IT, RECOGNIZING THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE SYSTEM WELL INTO THE 1990S. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WHILE THERE WILL NOT ALWAYS BE U.S. PERSONNEL ON THE AIRCRAFT THEMSELVES, THERE WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL AND CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. MILITARY AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN OPERATING THE AWACS SYSTEM.

THE BROAD UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON SHARING INFORMATION WILL HAVE DIRECT AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS FOR THE UNITED STATES. AWACS EARLY WARNING INFORMATYON WILL BE AVAILABLE ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS TO U.S. FORCES AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN OPERATION. AND THE FRAMEWORK OF CLOSER MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES THAT CAN BE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP FROM THIS UNDERSTANDING IS HIGHLY PROMISING.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE DECISIONS THAT YOU TAKE HERE IN THE COMING FEW DAYS ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATION. THEY WILL INFLUENCE THE WAY SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST VIEW THE UNITED STATES AS THEY DETERMINE THE FOREIGN POLICIES THEY WILL PURSUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS DECADE.

WILL THEY BE ABLE TO RELY ON THE UNITED STATES AS A

SECURITY PARTNER, OR WILL THEY HAVE TO TURN TO OTHER NATIONS TO ASSUME THAT ROLE?

WILL THE UNITED STATES BE SEEN AS SUPPORTIVE OF A STRONG ANTI-SOVIET POSTURE BY THE FREE NATIONS OF SOUTHWEST ASIA, OR WILL THEY BE FORCED TO TRIM THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES TO ACCOMMODATE NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MORE RADICAL STATES OF THE ARAB WORLD?

ABOVE ALL, WILL THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SUPPORTERS AND PROXIES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING LIBYA, SEE THAT THIS NATION IS ONCE AGAIN CAPABLE OF MAKING AND PURSUING A CONSISTENT POLICY TO SUPPORT AND STRENGTHEN ITS FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

THESE, MR. CHAIRMAN, ARE THE STAKES INVOLVED IN YOUR

DECISION AND, IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS WITH ALL THE URGENCY AT ITS COMMAND YOUR SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA.

END OF TEXT. HAIG